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Abstract. This contribution reveals some important structural properties
of the Czech labour market in the last fifteen years and evaluates possible
changes within this period. A small search and matching model incorporated
into standard macroeconomic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is
estimated using Bayesian techniques. The results show that search and match-
ing aspect provides satisfactory description of employment flows in the Czech
economy. Model estimates provide convincing evidence that wage bargaining
process is determined mainly by the power of the unions and that the insti-
tutional changes of the Czech labour market in the last fifteen years had only
little real impact on the matching effectiveness.
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1 Introduction
The goal of my contribution is to reveal some interesting and important structural properties of the
Czech labour market in the last fifteen years and to evaluate possible changes within this period. For this
purpose, I use a small search and matching model incorporated into standard macroeconomic dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE). Search and matching model is an important tool to model
labour market dynamics. This model is a log-linear version of the model originally developed by Lubik [4].
Using real macroeconomic data I am able to estimate some key labour market indicators: the wage
bargaining power of unions, the match elasticity of unemployed and the efficiency of the matching process.
The structure of my contribution is as follows. The next section provides a short description of the
small search and matching DSGE model which is used for my analysis. Section 3 discusses used data,
priors and estimation techniques. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 provides a deeper insight
into model properties and its ability to match observed data. Section 6 concludes this contribution with
some ideas regarding the possibilities of further research in this area.
2 The model
As mentioned previously, I use the model developed by Lubik [4]. It is a simple search and matching
model incorporated within a standard DSGE framework. The labour market is subject to friction because
a time-consuming search process for workers and firms. The wages are determined by the outcome of a
bargaining process which serves as a mechanism to redistribute the costs of finding a partner.
Households Representative household maximizes its expected utility function
Et
∞∑
j=1
βj−t
[
C1−σj − 1
1− σ
− χjnj
]
, (1)
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where C is aggregate consumption, n ∈ [0, 1] is a fraction of employed household members (determined
by the matching labour market), β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and σ ≥ 0 is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Variable χt represents an exogenous stochastic process which may be taken as a labour
shock. The budget constraint is defined as
Ct + Tt = wtnt + (1− nt)b +Πt, (2)
where b is unemployment benefit financed by a lump-sum tax, T . Variable Πt are profits from ownership
of the firms and w is wage. There is no explicit labour supply because it is an outcome of the matching
process. The first-order condition is thus simply
C−σt = λt, (3)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
Labour market The labour market is characterized by search frictions captured by a standard Cobb-
Douglas matching function
m(ut, vt) = µtu
ξ
tν
1−ξ
t , (4)
where unemployed job seekers, ut, and vacancies, νt, are matched at rate m(ut, νt). Parameter 0 < ξ < 1
is a match elasticity of the unemployed and µt is stochastic process measuring the efficiency of the
matching process. Aggregate probability of filling a vacancy may be defined as
q(θt) = m(ut, νt)/νt, (5)
where θt =
νt
ut
is a standard indicator of the labour market tightness. The model assumes that it
takes one period for new matches to be productive. Moreover, old and new matches are destroyed at a
constant separation rate, 0 < ρ < 1, which corresponds to the inflows into unemployment. Evolution of
employment, nt = 1− ut, is given by
nt = (1 − ρ) [nt−1 + νt−1q(θt−1)] . (6)
Firms As a deviation from the standard search and matching framework, the model assumes monopo-
listic firms. Demand function of a firm is defined by
yt =
(
pt
Pt
)−1−ǫ
Yt, (7)
where yt is firm’s production (and its demand), Yt is aggregate output, pt is price set by the firm, Pt is
aggregate price index and ǫ is demand elasticity which will be not treated as a stochastic process in my
empirical application. Production function of each firm is
yt = Atn
α
t , (8)
where At is an aggregate technology (stochastic) process and 0 < α ≤ 1 introduces curvature in produc-
tion. Capital is fixed and firm-specific. The firm controls the number of workers, nt, number of posted
vacancies, νt, and its optimal price, pt, by maximizing the inter-temporal profit function
Et
∞∑
j=1
βj−tλj
[
pj
(
pj
Pj
)−(1+ǫ)
Yj − wjnj −
κ
ψ
νψj
]
, (9)
subject to the employment accumulation equation (7) and production function (8). Profits are evaluated
in terms of marginal utility λj . The costs of vacancy posting is
κ
ψ
vψt , where κ > 0 and ψ > 0. For
0 < ψ < 1, posting costs exhibit decreasing returns. For ψ > 1, the costs are increasing while vacancy
costs are fixed for ψ = 1. The first-order conditions are
τt = α
yt
nt
ǫ
1 + ǫ
− wt + (1− ρ)Etβt+1τt+1, (10)
κνψ−1t = (1− ρ)q(θt)Etβt+1τt+1, (11)
where βt+1 = β
λt+1
λt
is a stochastic discount factor and τt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
employment constraint. The first condition represents current-period marginal value of a job. The
second condition is a link between the cost of vacancy and the expected benefit of a vacancy in terms of
the marginal value of a worker (adjusted by the job creation rate, q(θt)).
Wage bargaining Wages are determined as the outcome of a bilateral bargaining process between
workers and firms. Both sides of the bargaining maximize the joint surplus from employment relationship:
St ≡
(
1
λt
∂Wt(nt)
∂nt
)η (
∂Jt(nt)
∂nt
)1−η
, (12)
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining power of workers, ∂Wt(nt)
∂nt
is the marginal value of a worker to the
household’s welfare and ∂Jt(nt)
∂nt
is the marginal value of a worker to the firm. The term ∂Jt(nt)
∂nt
= τt is
given by the first-order condition (10). Recursive representation for ∂Wt(nt)
∂nt
is derived as
∂Wt(nt)
∂nt
= λtwt − λtb− χt + βEt
∂Wt+1(nt+1)
∂nt+1
∂nt+1
∂nt
. (13)
Using employment equation (6), it holds
∂nt+1
∂nt
= (1 − ρ)[1 − θtq(θt)]. All real payments are valued at
the marginal utility λt. Standard optimality condition for wages may be derived as
(1− η)
1
λt
∂Wt(nt)
∂nt
= η
∂Jt(nt)
∂nt
. (14)
Expression for the bargained wage is given after some algebra as
wt = η
[
α
yt
nt
ǫ
1 + ǫ
+ κνψ−1t θt
]
+ (1− η) [b+ χtC
σ
t ] . (15)
Closing the model The model assumes, that unemployment benefits, b, are financed by lump-sum
taxes, T , where a condition of balanced budget holds, i.e. Tt = (1 − nt)b. Social resource constraint
is thus Ct +
κ
ψ
νψt = Yt. The technology shock At, the labour shock χt and the matching shock µt are
assumed to be independent AR(1) processes (in logs) with coefficients ρi, i ∈ (A, ξ, µ) and innovations
ǫit ∼ N(0, σ
2
i ).
Log-linearised model For estimation purposes, I did not use the non-linear form of the model men-
tioned in the previous section (of course, this form is important to understand the meaning of the key
structural model parameters). Instead of that, I use a log-linear version of the model based on my
own derivations.1 In the following equations, the line over a variable means its steady-state value (de-
rived simply from the non-linear equations).2 The variables with a tilde represent the gaps from their
steady-states.
λ˜t = −σC˜t m˜t = µ˜t + ξu˜t + (1− ξ)ν˜t
q˜t = m˜t − ν˜t θ˜t = ν˜t − u˜t
n˜t = −
u
1− u
u˜t n˜t =
1
n+ vq
[un˜t−1 + qν(ν˜t−1 + q˜t−1)]
y˜t = (−1− ǫ)(p˜t − P˜t) + Y˜t y˜t = A˜t + αn˜t
τ˜t =
1
α y
n
ǫ
1+ǫw + (1− ρ)βτ
[
α
ǫ
1 + ǫ
(y˜t − n˜t)− ww˜t + (1− ρ)τβEt
(
β˜t+1 + τ˜t+1
)]
(ψ − 1)ν˜t = q˜t + Et
(
β˜t+1 + τ˜t+1
)
β˜t = λ˜t + λ˜t−1
w˜t =
1
w
[
η
(
α
ǫ
1 + ǫ
y
n
(y˜t − n˜t) + κν
ψ−1θ
(
(ψ − 1)v˜t + θ˜t
))
+ (1− η)χC
σ
(χ˜t + σC˜t)
]
Y˜t =
1
C + χ
ψ
νψ
(
CC˜t + κν
ψν˜t
)
1Log-linear version is not a part of the original contribution of Lubik [4].
2Initial steady-state values are calibrated as follows: µ∗ = A∗ = χ∗ = 1, β∗ = 0.99, u∗ = 0.0763, ν∗ = 0.0127.
Remaining steady-states are computed using these values and the prior means of all parameters.
A˜t = ρAA˜t−1 + ǫ
A
t χ˜t = ρχχ˜t−1 + ǫ
χ
t µ˜t = ρµµ˜t−1 + ǫ
µ
t Y˜t = ρY Y˜t−1 + ǫ
Y
t
The last equation results from the fact that variable Y˜ is an observed variable. We have thus four shocks
(ǫit for four observed variables – u˜, ν˜, w˜ and Y˜ ). The model consists of 17 endogenous variables (variable
(p˜t − P˜t) is a single variable in my application), four shocks and 14 parameters.
3 Data and priors
The model for the Czech economy is estimated using the quarterly data set covering a sample from
1996Q1 to 2010Q4. The observed variables are real output (GDP, in logs), hourly earnings (in logs),
unemployment rate and rate of unfilled job vacancies. All data are seasonally adjusted and de-trended
(excluding vacancies) using Hodrick-Prescott filter (with the smoothing parameter λ = 1600). The rate of
unfilled job vacancies was demeaned prior estimation. The variables used are expressed as corresponding
gaps. The original data are from databases of the OECD and the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO).3 In
the following parts, I will not use the mark ˜ to explicitly express the appropriate gaps.
Description Parameter Density Mean Std. Dev.
Discount factor β Fixed 0.99 —
Labor elasticity α Fixed 0.67 —
Demand elasticity ǫ Fixed 10 —
Relative risk aversion σ Gamma 1.00 0.50
Match elasticity ξ Gamma 0.70 0.10
Separation rate ρ Gamma 0.10 0.05
Bargaining power of the workers η Uniform 0.50 0.3
Unemployment benefits b Beta 0.20 0.15
Elasticity of vacancy creation cost ψ Gamma 1.00 0.50
Scaling factor on vacancy creation cost κ Gamma 0.10 0.05
AR coefficients of shocks ρ{χ,A,µ,Y } Beta 0.8 0.2
Standard deviation of shocks σ{χ,A,µ,Y } Inv. Gamma 0.05 ∞
Standard deviation of measurement errors σ∗{u} Uniform 0.001 0.0006
Standard deviation of measurement errors σ∗{w,ν} Uniform 0.001 0.0003
Table 1: Parameters description and prior densities
Parameters are estimated using Bayesian techniques combined with Kalman filtering procedures. All
computations have been performed using Dynare toolbox [2] for Matlab. Table 1 reports the model
parameters and the corresponding prior densities. The priors (and calibrations) are similar to those used
by Lubik [4]. On the other hand, the standard deviations are rather uninformative.
4 Estimation results
Table 2 presents the posterior estimates of parameters and 90% highest posterior density intervals. It
may be seen (in comparison with the Table 1) that most of the parameters are moved considerably from
their prior means. The data seems to be strongly informative. There are some remarkable results which
should be emphasized:
• The first surprising estimate is the bargaining power of workers, η. The mean value of this parameter
is almost 0.9 with a 90 percent coverage region that is shifted considerably away from the prior
density. This implies that the workers can gain the most of their entire surplus. The firms are
thus not willing to create vacancies. This result is in sharp contrast to the results of Lubik [4] or
Yashiv [6] who aimed to model the U.S. labour market.
3GDP at purchaser prices, constant prices 2000, s.a., CZSO, millions of CZK; index of hourly earnings (manufacturing),
2005=100, s.a., OECD; registered unemployment rate, s.a., OECD; unfilled job vacancies, level (transformed to ratio of
unfilled vacancies to labour force), s.a., OECD.
Posterior mean 90% HPDI Posterior mean 90% HPDI
σ 1.0399 0.6036 1.4894 ρµ 0.8281 0.7298 0.9525
ξ 0.6459 0.5823 0.7099 ρY 0.8695 0.8197 0.9241
ρ 0.0268 0.0086 0.0486 σχ 0.0162 0.0108 0.0214
η 0.8694 0.8311 0.9082 σA 0.0080 0.0067 0.0093
b 0.2924 0.1318 0.4688 σµ 0.0066 0.0059 0.0073
ψ 3.5706 3.0908 3.9944 σY 0.0095 0.0080 0.0108
κ 0.0880 0.0637 0.1199 σ∗u 0.0005 0.0002 0.0009
ρχ 0.7831 0.7208 0.8555 σ
∗
w 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004
ρA 0.9629 0.9332 0.9996 σ
∗
ν 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004
Table 2: Parameter estimates
• The second interesting result is the estimated separation rate, ρ. This parameter is considerably
lower than the one estimated by Lubik [4]. Its value supports the view of less flexible Czech labour
market with limited ability to destroy old and new matches.
• The third remarkable estimate is the vacancy posting elasticity, ψ. The posterior mean 3.57 is
shifted away from the prior mean. The vacancy creation is thus more costly because of increasing
marginal posting costs (increasing in the level of vacancies or labour market tightness, θ). Lubik [4]
estimated this parameter at the mean value of 2.53. In this case, the high value of ψ may be
interpreted as a balancing factor which “restrict” potentially excessive vacancy creation driven by
the low bargaining power. In case of the Czech labour market, this higher value provides further
evidence of specifically less flexible labour market.
• The estimate of parameter b corresponds to a reasonable value 0.3 which might be in accordance
with the real unemployment benefits paid within the Czech social insurance system (30% of average
wage).
• The posterior mean of the matching function parameter, ξ, is in accordance with the common values
in literature (see Lubik [4] or Christoffel et al. [1]).
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Figure 1: Trajectories of selected (smoothed) variables
Figure 1 presents the trajectories of selected smoothed variables. We can see a relative smooth
development of variable q (probability of filling a vacancy) with a sharp decline at the end of the year
2007. This evidence is in favour of conclusion presented by Neˇmec and Vasˇ´ıcˇek [5] who stressed the role
of an obvious lack of employees in the Czech economy. This tendency was reverted as a result of the last
global economic slowdown starting at the end of 2008. The efficiency of the matching process is strongly
correlated with the output gap (correlation coefficient is 0.8). This indicator is thus seemingly independent
of the institutional framework of the Czech labour market. It probably means that the changes in labour
market institution have been mostly marginal (with little real impacts). The correlation between output
gap and the matching variable m is relative small, 0.4. On the other hand, the correlation between actual
value of output gap and the lagged value of m is 0.65. Current value of matching function might be thus
an useful indicator of future (one-quarter ahead) changes in the real output (output gap).
5 Model evaluation
In order to see how the model fits the data, sample moments, autocorrelation coefficients and cross-
correlations are computed. I computed these statistics from simulation of the estimated models with
parameters set at their posterior means. All these statistics correspond to the four observed series
(unemployment gap, u, gap of vacancies, ν, gap of the wages, w, and output gap, Y ). The results may
be found in the Tables 3 and 4.
Sample moments Lags for autocorrelation coefficients
Mean Std. dev. 1 2 3 4
u data 0.00 0.009 0.91 0.71 0.45 0.16
model −0.00 0.010 0.88 0.70 0.51 0.35
90% HPDI (−0.01, 0.01) (0.007, 0.014) (0.79, 0.94) (0.48, 0.83) (0.11, 0.72) (−0.08, 0.62)
ν data 0.00 0.004 0.91 0.71 0.45 0.17
model 0.00 0.008 0.72 0.54 0.40 0.29
90% HPDI (−0.01, 0.01) (0.006, 0.011) (0.55, 0.87) (0.25, 0.80) (0.08, 0.73) (−0.09, 0.67)
w data 0.00 0.014 0.80 0.53 0.29 0.14
model 0.00 0.054 0.72 0.52 0.36 0.24
90% HPDI (−0.04, 0.04) (0.041, 0.071) (0.57, 0.84) (0.30, 0.72) (0.06, 0.61) (−0.09, 0.57)
Y data 0.00 0.020 0.91 0.74 0.54 0.33
model 0.00 0.017 0.79 0.62 0.47 0.36
90% HPDI (−0.01, 0.01) (0.012, 0.024) (0.64, 0.88) (0.33, 0.77) (0.09, 0.70) (0.01, 0.63)
Table 3: Sample moments and autocorrelation coefficients
Data Model (90% HPDI)
u ν w Y u ν w Y
u 1.00 −0.90 −0.74 −0.77 1.00 −0.17 −0.12 −0.16
(1.00, 1.00) (−0.56, 0.25) (−0.53, 0.31) (−0.66, 0.34)
ν −0.90 1.00 0.80 0.88 −0.17 1.00 0.63 0.72
(−0.56, 0.25) (1.00, 1.00) (0.25, 0.89) (0.46, 0.87)
w −0.74 0.80 1.00 0.60 −0.12 0.63 1.00 0.21
(−0.53, 0.31) (0.25, 0.83) (1.00, 1.00) (−0.26, 0.62)
Y −0.77 0.88 0.60 1.00 −0.16 0.78 0.21 1.00
(−0.66, 0.34) (0.46, 0.87) (−0.26, 0.62) (1.00, 1.00)
Table 4: Matrix of correlation
The model is very successful in matching sample moments and autocorrelation coefficients (they are
mostly within the appropriate 90% highest posterior density intervals). This ability is not used to be
typical for such a small-scale model. But, there is one exception regarding the fit of sample moments.
The model predicts higher volatility in wages. This pattern reveals the necessity of enrichment by a new
source of wage rigidity (as suggested by Krause and Lubik [3] or Christoffel et al. [1]).
My results are in accordance with the authors arguing that the model with search and matching fric-
tions in the labour market is able to generate negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment
(see Krause and Lubik [3]). Unfortunately, the values of cross-correlation coefficients (see the lowest
bounds of HPDI in the Table 4) are not sufficient for the correlations of unemployment and the rest of
observable variables. The similar experience may be found in the results for U.S. labour market provided
by Lubik [4]. Lubik pointed out that this may be due the presence of matching shock, which can act as
a residual in employment and wage equations.
6 Conclusion
In my contribution, I investigated structural properties of the Czech labour market using a simple DSGE
framework with labour market rigidities. Two sources of rigidities were implemented: wage bargaining
mechanism and ”‘search and matching”’ process matching workers and firms. Estimated model provides
satisfactory description of employment flows in the Czech economy. Parameter estimates provide con-
vincing evidence that wage bargaining process is determined mainly by the power of the unions and that
the institutional changes of the Czech labour market in the last fifteen years had only little real impact
on the matching effectiveness. Unfortunately, the model predicts higher volatility in wages. This pattern
reveals the necessity of enrichment by a new source of wage rigidity as proposed by Krause and Lubik [3]
or Christoffel et al. [1].
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